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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ROYAL AUDREY BACKUS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

I

vs.

Case No. 8375
I

BUS S. HOOTEN and ELLA H.
)
HOOTEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents agree with the statement of the case
set forth in appellant's brief, with the exception that respondents contend that there are other parts of the
plaintiff's complaint in addition to Paragraph 9, referred
to in the last paragraph of page one of appelant's brief,
which should not be taken as true in passing on respondents' motion to dismiss, namely, such allegations as are
contained in the last five lines of Paragraph 4 of plaintiff's complaint beginning with the word "and" in
the fifth line of said paragraph and the allegations contained in the last six lines of Paragraph 5 of plaintiff's
complaint beginning with the word "believing" in the
fifth line. These allegations are in the nature of beliefs
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or conclusions of the plaintiff, not facts. Only allegations
of fact well pleaded in the c.omplaint must be taken as
true in ruling on a pleading attacking the sufficiency
of the complaint to state a cause of action. STATE
EX REL STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH vs.
EVANS, COUNTY TREASURER OF WEBER COUNTY,
- 6 P. 2d 161, 79 Utah 370; PLATZ v. INTERNATIONAL
SMELTING CO.- 213 P.187, 61 Utah 342.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
BY RESPONDENTS
It is clear from the language of the complaint that
the contract entered into between the contractor, Busby,
and the land owners, respondents, was a contract for
the leveling of land for agricultural purposes and that
the appellant furnished to the contractor only machinery and equipment used in leveling the land for agricultural purposes.
Respondents contend that the c.omplaint does not
state a claim upon which relief can be granted for the
following reasons:
FIRST: That the contract pleaded, between the contractor, Busby, and the respondents, landowners, namely,
a contract for leveling land for agricultural purposes, is .
not a contract falling within the provisions of Section
14-2-1 U. C. A. 1953, requiring "The owner of any interest
in land entering into a contract involving $500.00 or more
for the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair
of any buildi'ng, structure or improvement upon land,"
to take out a bond "conditional for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for materials
furnished and labor performed under the contract." (Underlining ours).
SECOND: That Appellant by hiring machinery and
equipme·nt to the contractor, Busby, to be used by him in
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leveling land for agricultural purposes, did not "furnish
material or perform labor" in carrying out the contractor - landowners contract as contemplated by sections
14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U. C. A. 1953, and hence these sections
do not impose any personal liability on the landowners,
respondents, to pay the rental value of the such landleveling machinery and equipment furnished to the contractor. (Underlining ours).
ARGUMENT

1. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
A. THE RIGHTS OF CLAIMANTS UNDER MECHANICS LIEN LAW STATUTES AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS BOND STATUTES ARE PURELY
STATUTORY AND THESE STATUTES CANNOT
BE EXTENDED TO SITUATIONS OR PERSONS
NOT FALLING WITHIN THEIR TERMS.
In support of this rule see: AMERICAN TANK &
EGUIPMENT CO. V. T. E. WIGGINS, INC. ET AL, 42
P. 2d 115 (okl.), holding:
1. Mechanics' liens are in derogation of common law
and exist solely by positive statute, which courts should
construe and enforce as remedial acts, but which cannot to be extended to meet cases not within their scope.
Also see the authorities cited under subdivision "D"
of Rules of Statutory construction ..
B. THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF A STATUTE IS
TO BE DETERMINED FROM THE WHOLE AND
EVERY PART OF SUCH STATUTE.
BIRD & JEX CO. v. FUNK et al, 85 P. 2d 831, 96
Utah 450, holding: 4. Legislative intent and purposes in
enacting a statute is to be deduced from the whole and
every part of the statute taken together.
Hence in determining whether a landowner who enters into a contract for the leveling of his land for agri-
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cultural purposes falls within the burdens of the Private
Contractor Bond Statutes Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U. C.
A. 1953 or whether a claimant who rented machinery to
the land-leveling contractor falls within the benefits of
these statutes, it is not a matter of trying to decide what
the terms "or improvement upon land" and the terms
"material furnished or labor performed under the contract" taken alone mean. These terms must be construed
with the language which precedes and that which follows,
the entire language of these statutes.

C. WHERE GENERAL WORDS FOLLOW AN ENUMERATION OF SPECIFIC SITU AT I 0 N S OR
THINGS, SUCH GENERAL WORDS ARE HELD
AS APPLYING ONLY TO SITUATIONS OR THINGS
OF THE SAME GENERAL KIND OR CLASS AS
THOSE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED.
In support of this rule see: YOUNG v. SHRIVER et
al, 206 P. 99 (cal.); HOWE v. MYERS, 162 P. 100 (Wash.).
Under this rule the general terms "or improvement upon land" used in section 14-2-1 U. C. A. 1953,
should be co·nstrued as having the same general meaning as the specific situations or things preceding them,
namely "for the construction, addition to, or alteration
or repair of, any building, structure" upon land. The
statute relates to buildings or structures upon land. It
does not relate to situations or things or processes which
co·nsitute mere agricultural betterments of the land, but
which do not relate to the same classes or kinds of processes as those specifically mentioned.
The general words "or improvement upon la·nd"
which follow the specific cases and situations expressed
in the statute are restrained by words of specific enumeration preceding these general terms, namely, by the
words "for the construction, additio·n to, or alteration or
repair of any building, structure" a·nd by the general
scope and purpose declared in the entire section. WithSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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out limiting the scope of the enactment to the objects
which were intended as determined by fairly construing
the statute in its entirety, its meaning might be extended
to include every improvement of, or betterment to land,
which clearly was never intended. PILLOW v. KELLY
et at, 296 S W 11 (Tenn.)
D. MECHANICS LIEN STATUTES AND PRIVATE
CONTRACTORS BOND STATUTES SHOULD NOT
BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED AGAINST LANDOWNER TO BRING HIM WITHIN THE BURDENS
OR LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF
CLAIMANT TO BRING HIM WITHIN THE BENEFITS, OF THESE STATUTES.
:it is contended in appellant's brief that the statutes
relied upon by appellant, sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A.
1953, should be liberally construed against the landowners, respondents, and in favor of claimant, in an effort
to bring the landowners within the burdens of these
statutes, and in an effort to bring claimant within the
benefits of these statutes. Respondents contend that there
is no such rule requiring liberal construction of these
statutes against landowners in an effort to bring them
within the burdens of these statutes, who, without liberal
construction against them do not fall within the scope
of such statutes, or requiring a liberal construction in
favor of claimants, who except for the application of liberal construction in their favor would not fall within the
benefits of such statutes.

None of the cases cited in appellant's brief hold that
the statutes under consideration here or similar statutes
should be liberally construed against the landowner in an
effort to bring him within the language of the statutes
or in favor of claimant to bring him within the benefits
of such statutes. None of these cases involved the question of what type of improvement falls within the statutes
or what type or kind of items furnished fall within the
terms "performed labor" or "furnished materials."
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The only point decided by the case of RIO GRANDE
LUMBER CO v. DARKE et al, 167 P. 241, 50 Utah 114,
quoted from in appelant's brief P. 10 as supporting liberal
construction against landowners, was that Chapter 91
Laws of Utah 1915, which was a forerunner of Section
14-2-1 U.C.A. 1953, was constitutional. No question was
raised or decided as to whether the statutes should be
liberally construed against a landowner in an effort to
bring him within the terms of the statute. In this case
respondents furnished building materials which went
into the building, and hence both the landowner and
the claimant clearly fell within the scope of the statute. The language from this case quoted in appellant's
brief was mere "loose talk" and did not relate to liberal
construction either for or against the landowner or for
or against the claimant, as no such point was involved
in the case.
The only point decided by the case of LIBERTY
COAL & LUMBER CO. v. SNOW, 178 P. 341, 53 Utah
298, (quoted from in appellant's brief P. 10) was that
under Laws 1915, Chapter 91, a son, owner of land, who
agreed with father that later should cause to be erected
thereon, in return for use of land for indefinite period, a
building worth from $1,000. to $1,100. was under duty to
obtain from builder, or to require his father to obtain,
bond securing payment for material furnisned, in default
of which he himself was personally liable to materialmen. The court held that the agreement between the
son, landowner, and the father, contractor, providing for
the building of a building costing over $500. clearly fell
within the statute and that plaintiff who furnished materials which went into the house also clearly fell within
the provisions of the statutP.. No question of liberal construction to bring the landowner within the provisions
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of the statute was involved. The structure built by the
contractor was a dwelling house and claimant had furnished building materials which went into the house.
The statute construed in the case of MELLON v.
VONDOR-HORST BROS. et al, 140 P. 130, 44 Utah 300,
quoted from in appellant's brief P. 11, was an entirely
different statute than the statutes involved in our case.
The statute relied upon by appellant was a statute provided that any person who had furnished materials or
had performed labor for a contractor in the construction
of any public building, may at any time before the contract price has been fully paid, bring an actio·n against
the contractor and the public body for the recovery of
the amount due, and may obtain a judgment against
both the contractor and the public body to the extent of
reaching any funds in the hands of the public body due
to the contractor. There was no question but what the
appellant had performed labor and furnished materials
in the construction of the public building, which brought
claimant clearly within the statute. The court held that
appellant was clearly entitled under the statute to reach
the funds and was not required to obtain personal service
on the contractor before reaching the funds. The language quoted about liberal construction has no application to our case.
ELWELL v. MORROW et al, 78 p. 605, 28 Utah 278,
quoted in appellant's brief P. 12 as favoring liberal construction, likewise involved an entirely different point
than is raised in our case. The question in the Elwell
case was whether intervener had waived his lien by not
filing and proving his lien within the time specified
in the notice which was published as required by statute
(before Feb. 20, 1903). The court held that claimant,
being an original contractor, had 60 days after the completion of his contract in which to file for record his
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claim for lien, and that he could not be deprived of this
right by respondent Elwell arbitrarily fixing a date in his
published notice requiring lienholders not parties to the
suit to file their liens in c.ourt on a date before the ex~
piration of the 60 day period. The items furnished, building materials, and the structure built, a dwelling house,
clearly fell within the scope of the statute and there was
no necessity for invoking a liberal construction of the
statute against the landlord to bring him within the burdens or in favor of the claimant to bring him within the
benefits of the statute.

Not one of the cases cited, quoted from, or discussed
in Appellant's Brief from pages 13 to 19, both inclusive,
as favoring liberal construction, involved the construction of either a Mechanics Lien Law Statutes or a Private Contractor's Bond Statute or a Public Contractor's
Bond Statute. Every one of these cases involved the question of the liability of a surety company under a surety
bond, and involved the construction of the surety bond
in each case. The statements made in these cases about
liberal construction all related to the rule to be applied
in the construction of surety bonds. Certainly, a surety
bond, a contract, written, worded and issued by a surety
for hire should be liberally construed against the surety
company and in favor of a third party claimant under
the bond. Quite a different rule of construction prevails
in construing a surety bond in an action against the surety company, than prevails when construing either a mechanic's lien law statute or a private contractor's bonn
statute, when attempting to determine what burdens
are imposed by the statute upon the landowner and what
third party claimants can claim be·nefits under such
statutes. Such statutes are not liberally construed
against the landowner and in favor of the claimant when
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deciding what contracts fall within the burdens of the
statutes and what claimants fall within the benefits of
such statutes, as is hereinafter more fully pointed out.
Why should Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953,
be liberally construed against landowners, in respondents
situation, in an effort to bring them within the burdens
of these statutes. Respondents had no part in hiring the
land-leveling equipment from appellant-from all that
appears in the Complaint respondents knew nothing of
the machinery and equipment used by the contractor
having been hired - this was a deal entirely between the
!and-leveling contractor and appellant. Appellant has a
cause of action against Busby, the contractor, with whom
appellant dealt and doubtless originally intended to look
to, for the contract price or the rental value of the machinery and equipment. Why should appella·nt not be
required to look to the person with whom appellant dealt?
Respondents were legally required to pay and have paid
the land-leveling contractor, Busby, the full contract
price for the leveling of their land. If the statutes are
now liberally construed (stretched to the breaking
point) to bring respondents within the burdens of the
statutes respondents will have to pay twice for the leveling of their lands. Most farmers have difficulty in paying once for the leveling of their lands for agricultural
purposes, and for other necessary agricultural betterments of their lands, and should not be required to pay
twice. What are the equities against respondents in our
case ·which demand a liberal construction of these statutes against them? And what equities are there in our
case that require that these statutes be liberally construed in favor of appellant in an effort to bring appellant
within the benefits of the statutes? There are none.
In support of the rule designated D above, that
Mechanics' Lien Statutes and Private Contractor's Bond
Statutes should not be liberally construed against a landowner to bring him within the burdens of these statutes
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or should not be liberally construed in favor of a claimant to bring him within the benefits or scope of these
statutes, respondents submit the following authorities:
NANZ et al v. CUMBERLAND GAP PARKS CO., S. W.
999 (TENN.)
1. The rule that mechanics' lien statutes are to be
liberally construed does not extend to the determination
of what persons are entitled to liens thereunder, to which
rna tter a statute can not be extended by construction.
In this case the court said: "We think the statue
refers to erections, structures, machinery, and buildings
-things constructed upon the land-and not the enrichi'ng of the soil and beautifying the grounds by planting
flowers, shrubs and trees upon it."
PHILLIPS v. GRAVES, 9 P. 2d 490 (Oregon)
5. Mechanics' lien statutes are strictly construed,
especially in determining beneficiaries.
6. One claiming mechanic's lien must prove that he
is within group mentioned in statutes as entitled thereto.
TIMBER STRUCTURES, INC. v. C. W. S. GRINDING
& MACHINE WORKS, 229 P. 2d 623 (Oregon).

11. One claiming a mechanic's lien must, in the first
instance, bring himself clearly within the terms of statutes creating lien.
12. The Mechanics' Lien Statute is strictly construed
as to persons entitled to its benefits and as to procedure
necessary to perfect lien, but when claimant's right has
been clearly established the law will be liberally interpreted to accomplish purposes of its enactment.
BELL BROS. & CO., INC. v. ARNOLD et al. - 68 SW 2d
958 (Tenn.)
3. Mechanic's lien, being purely statutory, is not
liberally c.onstrued to be enforceable against persons not
e·numerated in statute.
IN RE AMERICAN LIME CO. - 201 FED. 433, at
PAGE 435 it was said: "(2) It is well settled, however,
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that while this statute is to be liberally construed in
reference to the property to which the lien attaches, only
those persons enumerated and embraced in the statute
are to be held entitled to the lien and that no persons are
to be included under its provisions unless they make it
clearly appear that they are so entitled, without a
strained construction of the statute."
ANDERSON et al, v. CHAMBLISS et al, 262 P. 2d 298
(Oregon)
3. Because the right to a lien is purely statutory,
a claimant to such a lien must in the first instance bring
himself clearly within terms of Mechanics' Lien Law.
4. The Mechanics' Lien Law is strictly construed as
to persons entitled to its benefits and as to the procedure
necessary to perfect the lien.
6. When claimant's right to mechanics' lien has been
clearly established, Mechanics' Lien Law will be liberally interpreted toward accomplishing the purpose of its
enactment.
RICHARDSON v. LANIUS, 263 SW 799 (Tenn.)
6. Mechanic's liens statutes are strictly construed
against those seeking to come within them, and liberally
construed as to inclusion of property and subjecting it
to lien, but are not given a strained construction to bring
one within their provisions.
PILLOW v. KELLY et al. - 296 SW 11 (Tenn.)
1. The mechanic's lien statute (Shannon's Code Sec.
3531) protects those embraced within its terms, and cannot be extended by construction.
2. Court cannot extend benefit of mechanic's lien
statute (Shannon's Code Sec. 3531) to either persons
or objects not embraced within its terms, a·nd in determining its breadth and scope must be guided both by
words and context.
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II. A CONTRACT FOR THE LEVELING OF LAND FOR
AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 14-2-1 U.C.A. 1953
It is important to keep in mind that the land leveling to be done under the alleged contract between
respondents, landowners, and the contractor, Busby, was
the leveling of land for agricultural purposes. The land
leveling called for by the contract was not incidental
to or a part of the process of the construction of any
building or structure upon the land. Our case is not
to be confused with excavations or the moving of dirt
involved in the digging of a basement or the moving of
dirt or the breaking of land in connection with the
building of a building or structure upon land, as these
operations are as much a part of the process of building
a building or structure as the building of the roof.
We are confronted with the question, does the statute 14-2-1 U.C.A. 1953, apply to a c,ontract calling for the
mere moving of the soil, a contract for the leveling of
land for agricultural purposes.

In deciding this question it must be kept in mind that
when deciding who falls within the burdens and the
benefits of Mechanics' Lien Statutes and Private Contractors' Bond Statutes, such statutes should not be extended
by c,onstruction and should not be liberally construed
against a landowner, in an effort to bring him within the
burdens of the statute, or be liberally construed in favor
of a claimant in an effort to bring him within the benefits of such statutes.
We must also keep in mind that the words "or improvement upon land" must be construed in connection
with the words which precede them and when these general terms are construed in connection with the specific
enumeration which precedes them, namely, "for the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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building, structure" it is clear that these general terms
apply to the same class or kind as those specifically mentioned which relate to buildings or structures, and that
these general terms do not apply to agricultural processes or agricultural betterments, such as the railing
of brush, or the removal of trees, or the first breaking
of the land, or the hauling of manure or the application
of other fertilizers to the land, or to the mere moving of
dirt, having no connection with the building of any building or structure, or the leveling of land for agricultural
purposes, or to the planting and cultivating of shrubs and
orchards, or to the planting and cultivating of perrennial
leguminous crops such as alfalfa, and similar "agricultural betterments" or "improvements" of or to the land and
which admittedly enhance the value of the land but
which clearly do not fall within the classes of improvements or structures upon the land specifically enumerated in the wording preceding the general terms "or improvement upon land."
In support of the rule that these and similar agricultural processes, or agricultural betterments or improvements do not fall within the scope of the Utah
statutes and similar statutes, respondents submit the following authorities:
YOUNG v. SHRIVER-206 P. 99, 56 Cal. App 653, held
that a mechanics' lien does not lie for the plowing and
breaking of farm lands for the first time, even under a
statute giving a lien, "to any one who grades, fills-in or
otherwise improves any lot or tract of land, or the street
or sidewalk adjoining the same, or who makes any improvements in connection therewith." The statute involved was a much more favorable statute to the claimant than is our statute.
In this case the court said: "It seems to us that there
are substantial reasons why a lien should not lie for labor
performed in preparing lands for use for agric,ultural pur-
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poses in any case. If a lien were allowable for plowing the
land, by analogy a lien would be allowable for labor performed in fertilizing and cultivating and planting it to
crops or in harvesting the crops or any other labor necessarily incident to the business of farming or of fruit
raising or any other purpose to which large bodies of agricultural lands may be adapted and put."
BROWN v. WYMAN and another, 9 NW 344, held:
The breaking of land for the first time is not an improvement upon land and hence not lienable under Sec. 2130
of Code securing a lien to "every mechanic or other person who shall do any labor upon, or furnish any materials, machinery, or fixtures for, any buildi'ng, erection, or
other improvement upon land." The court said: "Now
while breaking and turning over of the soil may constitute an improvement of the land, it cannot in any
just sense be denominated an improvement upon the
land ... Fertilizers greatly improve land. It would probably not be claimed that a lien would be acquired for
hauling manure upon land."
OGDEN v. BYINGTON et al, 244 P. 332 (Cal.)
2. Plaintiff, furnishing tenant stock and equipment
for construction of irrigation ditches and levee work in
preparing certain lands for planting rise, HELD not to
have a lien on such land, under code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1183,
establishing mechanic's lien, or section 1191, providing
for lien on lots for improvement; work not having structural character or permanency necessary to bring it within statute.
HOWE v. MYERS.- 162 P. 1000, 94 Wash. 563, held labor
for c,ultivating and caring for an orchard, which admittedly enhanced the value of the land, was not lienable under
a statute providing that: "Any person who, at the request
of the owner of any real property, his agent, contractor
or sub-contractor, clears, grades, fills in or otherwise
improves the same, or any street or road in front of or
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adjoining the same, has a lien upon such real property
for the labor performed, or the materials furnished for
such purposes."

I
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In this case the court said: "If the claim asserted is
lienable under this statute, it must be so by virtue of the
clause 'or otherwise improves the same.' It cannot be
said that labor performed in cultivating and caring for
an orchard is of the same general character or in the
same general class as labor in grading, clearing, or filling
in land, and therefore, under the well-known rule of
ejusdem generis, is not within the statute. EASTER ARK.
HEDGE-FENCE CO. v. TANNER, 67 Ark. 156, 53 S.W.
886 It is well settled that liens of this character are in
derogation of the common law. They depend for their existence solely on the statutes, and the courts refuse to extend their operation for the benefit of those who do not
come clearly within the terms of the statute." (Underlining ours).
III. RENTAL VALUE OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT HIRED TO CONTRACTOR AND USED BY HIM
IN CARRYING OUT CONTRACT FOR LEVELING LAND
FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES IS NEITHER "MATERIALS FURNISHED" OR "LABOR PERFORMED"
UNDER THE CONTRACT AND IS NOT WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF SECTIONS 14-2-1 AND 14-2-2 U. C. A: 1953.
The language of the statute limits the personal
liability of the landowner, who has not required the contractor to furnish a bond, (assuming it was a case where
the thing being built brought the contract within the
statute), to those who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract." The statute does not
extend the personal liability of the landowner to one who
has furnished a tool, a device, a machine, or piece of
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equipment which was used in the construction, addition
to, or alteration or repair of any building, structure or
improveme·nt upon land.
Modern tools, devices, machines and equipment are
used in accomplishing labor but this does not mean that
a bare tool, device, or machine constitutes labor or that
the bare furnishing of a tool, device or machine constitutes "labor performed" or that the bare "rental value of
machinery or equipment" hired to the contractor constitutes "labor performed." If a contractor or any other person does the work of construction with the use of a tool~
or a device, or a machine, or equipment this constitutes
"labor performed." We are certainly not contending that
labor need be performed with one's hands or that modern
tools, machinery and equipment cannot be used in performing the labor of construction. But, if a third person
merely hires a tool, a device, a machine or equipment to
a contractor or to someone else who is engaged in the
construction, he does not himself, simply by furnishing
a machine, "perform labor" in the construction. The
bare furnishing of a machine is not performing labor. The
tool, device or machine itself is not labor. When the contractor or workman engaged in the construction adds his
skill and direction to the machine or tool, applies the
"Know How" and operates the tool or machine, and sometimes uses other elements to make it work, such as gasoline or electricty, then "labor" is performed, but the
tool, device or machine standing alone and un-applied
(the thing hired in our case) does not constitute labor.
It is the person who puts the machine to work who performs the labor, not the one who hires or otherwise furnishes the machine or tool to the c.ontractor or workman.
It is respondents contention that the Utah Supreme
Court has never heretofore passed on either of the questions involved in our case, namely, {1) whether a con~
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tract for the leveling of land for agricultural purposes
falls within the scope of the Utah Private Contractors'
Bond Statutes; or (2) whether one who hires land-leveling machinery and equipment to a land-leveling contractor falls within the scope of these statutes, as one
who has "furnished rna terials or performed labor under
the contract."
The decision in the case of J. F. TOLTON INV. CO.
v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. 293 P. 611, 77 Utah 226,
is definitely not controlling or even in point i'n our case

!!SIIfi ,.

as that case involved the construction of a surety bond
while our case involves the construction of the Utah
Private Contractors' Bond Statutes and quite a different
rules of construction applies in the two cases. The same
situation prevailed in all other cases cited in Appellant's
Brief pages 13 to 19, both inclusive. Every one of these
cases involved the construction of surety bond, and the

-)

con·

rule of liberal construction against the surety for hire was
applied in all of these cases. As heretofore pointed out a
different rule applies when construing Mechanics' Lien
Statutes and Private Contractors' Bond Statutes, particularly when determining what perso·ns and objects fall
within their scope. These statutes should not be liberally
construed against a landowner in an effort to bring a
landowner within the scope of the statute, who except
for liberal construction, does not belong there, as heretofore pointed out.
In the majority opinion in the case of J. F. TOLTO INV. CO. v. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO., supra, it
was recognized that there is a conflict in the decisions
as to whether an item for rental on equipment falls within the surety bond, (indeed there are many well reasoned
cases holding to the contrary), and the court said: "without further reference to the cases, it may be said that,
under the liberal rule of interpretation to which we are
committed, we conclude that the charge in question is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
within the obligatio·n of the bond, and the surety was
properly held liable." (Underlined ours). The "liberal
rule of interpretation" referred to in the opinion is the
rule requiring a liberal construction or a surety bond,
against a surety for hire. No such rule of liberal construction against the landowner can be properly applied when
construing the statutes involved in our case to determine
whether the contract in question falls within the statutes
or the thing furnished by appellant falls within these
statutes.
Justice Straup wrote a strong dissenting opinion
in the TOLTON case in which he forcibly pointed out
that the rentals agreed to be paid by the contractor for
the use of an engine or other machinery used on the job
was neither "materials" or "labor" within the mea·ning of
the contract, and were not covered by the surety bond,
despite the rule of liberal construction against the surety.
Must every landowner who has some structure built
upon his land, where the amount involved exceeds $500.,
inquire from the contractor and everyone who participates in the construction, whether every tool, appliance,
device, or item of machinery or equipment used on the
job has been rented, and if so must he decide at his peril
whether the rental value of such tool, appliance, device,
or machine has been paid? If the workman or contractor
says he owns the tool, appliance, device, or machine that
he is using must the landowner then ascertain at his peril
whether the full purchase price has been paid - as no
distinction should be made between one who leases equiPment and one who sells it to a workman or c,ontractor?
Or is it sufficient if the landowner takes precautions to
see that those who have "furnished materials" or "performed labor" within the ordinary and sensible meaning
of these terms have been paid?
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Had the Utah Legislature intended to impose liability
on a landowner to pay the rental value of machinery,
tools, appliances, or equipment hired to the contractor
or anyone involved in the construction, and used on the
job and then returned, it would have said so, like some
state legislatures have done. As the statute stands it is
not so worded, and cannot be extended by construction
to read something into it which is not there.
When the statutes in question are not liberally construed against the landowner certainly it should be held
that re·ntal on machinery and equipment furnished to the
land-leveling contractor does not fall within the scope
of these statutes.
The following authorities are submitted as supporting the rule that the rental value of machinery and equipment hired to the contractor or to someone else on the
job, which is used on the job but not consumed, is
neither "materials furnished" or "labor performed," and
does not fall within the scope of Mechanics' Lien Statutes
or Private Contractors' Bond Statutes having the same o"r
similar wording as the Utah Statutes:
36 AM. JUR. Page 56, Sec. 70. " .... The general rule
is that articles furnished for use merely as tools and appliances in carrying on the work of construction are not
materials for which a mechanics' lien may be claimed.
The same is true of machinery furnished for the contractor for use as a part of his plant or operations."
ROAD SUPPLY & METAL CO. v. BECHTELHEIMER et al, 240 P. 846, (Kan.) 2. The rent or value of the
use of machinery, tools, and equipment used in public
work is neither labor nor material within the meaning of
our statutes pertaining to mechanics' liens.
NINNEMAN et al v. CITY OF LEWISTON, 129 P.
1073 (Idaho) .
1. A lien cannot be had under the mechanic's lien
laws of this state for tools and appliances which are the
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property of the contractors or laborers, and that are not
necessarily consumed in the specific work, but which may
be used, from time to time, in other works and upon other contracts
WILKINSON v. PACIFIC MID-WEST OIL CO. et al
107 P. 2nd 726 (Kan.)
1. The rent or value of the use of machinery cannot
be made the basis of a mechanics' lien.
CONSOLIDATED CUT STONE CO. et al, v. SEIDENBACH at al, 75 P. 2nd 442 (Okl.)
16. A subcontractor was not entitled to lien for rental for use of pans and ends which were furnished to contractor to hold concrete in place in building operations
and which were removed by owner to be used on other
jobs, since such pans and ends did not become part of the
building.
MARION MACIDNE, FOUNDRY & SUPPLY CO. v.
ALLEN et al., 241 P. 450 (Kan.)
2. The tools and equipment used in the sinking of
an oil and gas well, which forms no part of the well or
completed work, is neither "labor not material" within
the meaning of the lien statute.
GILBERT HUNT CO. v. PARRY, 110 P. 541, (Wash.)
1. Under the lien laws, generally, "material" is
deemed to be something that goes into, and becomes
a part of the finished structure, such as lumber, mails,
glass, hardware, etc., which are necessary to the completion of a building.
2. The object of the lien statutes being to secure a
lien for that which goes into the structure, articles furnished for use merely as tools and appliances are not
lienable.
AMERICAN TANK & EQUIPMENT CO. v. T. E.
WIGGINS, INC., et al., 42 P. 2d 114 (Okl.)
1. Mechanics' liens are in derogation of c,ommon law
and exist solely by positive statute, which courts should
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construe and enforce as remedial acts, but which cannot
be extended to meet cases not within their scope.
3. Purchase price of pipe furnished to contractor for
use in pumping sand and water in constructing embankment on railroad right of way held not lienable, since pipe
constituted part of contractor's equipment.
nn~t

HALL et al., v. COWEN et al., 98 P. 670, 51 Wash.
295.
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1 A claim for rental on scrapers is neither "labor
performed" nor "material furnished," within Ballinger's
Ann. Codes & St. Sac. 5902, giving one who at the owner's
request, grades, etc. land or a street in front thereof, a
lien for the "labor performed" and "materials furnished."
The Court in HENRY BICKEL CO. v. NATIONAL
SURETY CO. et al, 156 Ky. 695, 161 S. W. 1113, said: "The
engine which was used in this case occupied the same
place as a hammer, saw, or other tool used by the Workmen. The person who rented the engine is no more entitled to a lien .... than the merchant would be who sold
the spades, drills, or other tools constituting his plant."
CONCLUSION
Owing to the fact that the contract pleaded, namely
a contract for the leveling of land for agricultural purposes does not fall within the scope of the Utah Statutes
relied upon by Apellant, and the rental value of machinery and equipment hired by Appellant to the land-leveling contractor constitute ·neither "materials furnished"
or "labor performed" under the contract, hence Appellant's Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief
can be granted and the decision of the District Court
granting Respondents' Motion to Dismiss and dismissing
the Complaint should be affirmed.
Respec.tfully submitted,
DURHAM MORRIS
Attorney for Respondents.
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